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Borrowed Scripts: Democratization and Military Mutinies in West and 
Central Africa 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article identifies a spike in mutinies in West and Central Africa during the 1990s and 
examines this increased number of revolts in relation to the economic and political climate 
of the time.   Using interviews with former mutineers as well as analysis of their public 
statements during the revolts, the research demonstrates that the soldiers were often inspired 
by the messages and ideas spread through the civilian democratization movements at the 
time.  It challenges the idea that African rank and file soldiers were immune to the political 
climate and instead argues that they borrowed a script from the civilian movement during 
mutinies.  The article will also look beyond the 1990s and examine why mutinies in West 
and Central Africa may be most common in countries that display respect for civil liberties 
and political freedoms. The analysis contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the 
relationship between the junior ranks of the military and civilian society. 
 
Key words: military, mutiny, indiscipline, democracy, civil-military relations 
 
Introduction 
 
  While academic literature has given considerable attention to coups d’état, 
mutinies have gone largely unexamined within the study of African militaries.  Although 
mutiny is considered ‘one of the constants in the history of military organizations,’ i the 
limited research on mutinies in Africa consists primarily of individual case studies, mostly 
of incidents following closely after independence.  There have been no longitudinal studies 
to help indicate when mutinies most often occur nor are there attempts to situate the choice 
to mutiny within the wider political context, in the way that coup studies often do.   
The research for this article counters that trend with an examination of mutinies 
between 1960 and 2012 in West and Central Africa.ii  This study reveals a significant spike 
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in the occurrence of mutinies in the region during the 1990s. This article explains the 
unequal distribution by linking the increase in mutinies in the 1990s to the political and 
economic climate of the time. The spike corresponded with what is often referred to as the 
democratization period in Africa.  It was a time of both turbulence and hope with quick 
collapses of authoritarian regimes, increases in competitive elections, and more political 
rights for the average citizen.  However, debates continue about whether the political 
reforms seen during the 1990s were successful and lasting.iii   
Militaries in African states in the 1990s are often viewed to have been a barrier to 
the democratic reforms that were demanded by citizens across the continent.  For example, 
Eboe Hutchful argues that the democracy movement ‘won the battle for civil society but 
lost the battle for the military.’iv  He laments the ‘failure of the democracy movement to 
‘capture’ key sectors of the military.’v  I agree with Hutchful that militaries in Africa were 
generally not active participants in progressing democratic change; however I will argue 
that in many ways they were ‘captured’ by the themes of the movement.  Their rhetoric 
and demands often appeared to be borrowing a script from civilian groups advocating for 
greater democratic rights.  As the below sections will demonstrate, soldiers began to 
incorporate language of human right and civil liberties into their public expressions of 
dissatisfaction. Just as civil society ‘rediscovered their popular voice’vi, so did the military, 
although the junior soldiers often expressed theirs through mutinies.  
While the paper centres on mutinies, the findings move beyond military 
indiscipline to examine the way soldiers appropriated popular political themes. The use of 
political rhetoric by mutineers in the 1990s, as examined in this article, has some 
similarities to the ways militaries in the 1970s and 1980s often embraced socialist and 
Marxist themes.vii The political language used by these military regimes has been criticized 
as a “convenient ideological gloss”viii and similar patterns will be discussed in regards to 
mutineers’ adaptation of democratic rhetoric. Unlike coup leaders who want to project 
themselves as political leaders different from their predecessors, mutineers’ use of political 
language is unexpected. They are generally not instigating political change but rather 
utilizing popular political themes to discuss their own conditions within the military.  
Following an explanation of methodology, the article will demonstrate how 
increased soldier dissatisfaction in the 1990s can be partially attributed to international 
economic factors at the time.  It will also illustrate how the end of the Cold War affected 
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soldiers’ conditions as well as their willingness to make demands to the government.  Next, 
an examination of the rhetoric and demands made by mutineers will show that they often 
adopted messages and ideas spread through the civilian democratization movements. 
While this article will focus mostly on the 1990s, its lessons are not restricted to this time 
period.  The last section will look beyond the 1990s and examine why mutinies in West 
and Central Africa may be most common in countries that display respect for civil liberties 
and political freedoms.  
 
 
Identifying Mutinies  
 
Data for this article is drawn from a wider study on mutinies in Africa.ix  Using a 
range of sources, including a systematic review of Africa South of the Sahara, Africa 
Confidential, Africa Research Bulletin, and West Africa, I identified incidents of mutiny in 
West and Central Africa from 1960-2012. Additional information about mutinies came 
from academic writing, memoirs, other news outlets, and declassified and leaked 
intelligence reports.  In reviewing these sources I was looking for events which included 
the following traits: 1) a group of soldiers who remain within the state’s military structure 
and 2) use mass insubordination to express stated grievances and goals beyond the desire 
for political power to higher political and military authorities.  This is an intentionally 
conservative definition of mutinies, which excludes other types of military indiscipline 
such as desertion or coups.   
Differentiating between coups and mutinies is not always straightforward as in 
practice they sometimes may overlap. x The research found that it was rare for a mutiny to 
directly escalate into a successful coup but separate incidents of mutiny at times precede 
coups. There are also cases in which an event is considered as both a mutiny and a failed 
coup attempt depending on the source.xi While the same events can be interpreted as 
having different motivations (and even members of the same unit can have different goals), 
it is also significant to note that the vast majority of the events in the mutiny chart below 
have not been recorded in coup datasets. 
The study also involved field research in Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, and The 
Gambia in which former mutineers, military leadership, politicians, civil society leaders, 
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and journalists were interviewed in regards to incidents of mutiny.xii  This allowed for 
unique insight into the perspective of the individuals who conducted or experienced the 
mutinies first-hand.  Through this combination of primary and secondary research I 
identified sixty-six incidents of mutiny.  Analysis of these cases showed that mutineers in 
this region are primarily rank and file soldiers and they generally use the mutiny to express 
both material grievances as well as a sense of injustice concerning their treatment by 
higher authorities. 
Figure 1 below chronologically charts the incidents of mutiny and visually 
demonstrates the dramatic increase in the 1990s.  This spike in mutinies poses an 
interesting question of why there would be such a large increase in revolts during this 
decade.  It is possible that there was under-reporting of mutinies during the 1970s and 
1980s due to a deficit of press freedoms in many states at the time.  However, the below 
analysis will demonstrate that there are numerous reasons for both the lack of mutinies in 
the earlier decades and prevalence of mutinies in the 1990s, which go beyond 
methodological explanations. 
 
Figure 1xiii 
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The grievances of soldiers in the 1990s are part of a wider economic crisis, which 
had its roots in the financially difficult times in the previous decades.  By the beginning of 
the 1980s ‘virtually every African country was manifesting signs of acute economic 
distress, reflected in a mounting and unsustainable debt burden, a permanent trade deficit 
and an acute fiscal crisis which meant that the state was unable to maintain basic 
infrastructure or fund essential social services.’xiv  International financial institutions and 
Western governments deemed that uncontrolled state expenditures were a primary cause of 
the economic crisis across the continent and African states were pressured to accept 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs).  SAPs required states to pursue economic reforms 
as stipulated by international institutions in order to receive loans from them.xv   As part of 
these programs  
donors attempted to impose a predetermined ceiling (or ‘acceptable level’) on the 
military expenditures of the states.  These attempts were directed especially at those 
states deemed to be engaged in ‘excessive’ or ‘unproductive’ expenditures on the 
military at the expense of the social sector and economic development.xvi 
 
SAPs therefore threatened the interests of the military, which had grown substantially 
throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s.  
Although there were various ways in which states attempted to manoeuvre around 
full implementation of the required changes, militaries saw significant decreases in size 
and expenditures by the 1990s.xvii The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s 
(SIPRI) database of military expenditures from 1988 onwards shows a steady decline in 
military expenditures from the late 1980s through the late 1990s across sub-Saharan Africa.  
During this period defense spending was the highest in 1989 when total military 
expenditure was $14.4 billion and reached its lowest in 1996 with $9.5 billion.xviii  The 
figures also decreased when examined as a proportion of GDP (from 3.0 percent in 1990 to 
2.6 percent in 1998) and as a proportion of central government spending (from 11.8 
percent to 8.5 percent).xix However, these reductions were disproportionate across sub-
Saharan Africa with South Africa, Angola and Ethiopia accounting for the largest 
decreases in expenditures.xx Analysis of specific countries within West and Central Africa 
using the SIPRI dataset shows variations between countries but the pattern of declining 
military spending from the late 1980s to late 1990s is still a general trend in many states.  
For example, Burkina Faso and Guinea Bissau each saw military spending nearly halved 
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between the late 1980s and late 1990s, while Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire also saw decreases 
in military spending between 20 and 35 percent. In relation to decreased defense funding, 
the number of military personnel was reduced from the 1980s into the 1990s.  The size of 
sub-Saharan African militaries had quadrupled between 1963 and 1979 but then fell by a 
third by the mid 1990s.xxi   
In order to understand the increase in mutinies in the 1990s it is necessary to view 
how the decreased defense budgets presented above affected the average soldier.  Military 
spending alone is not a definitive indicator of whether a military is content, especially at 
the lower levels, as military spending does not necessarily equate to better conditions for 
soldiers.xxii  However, we are not left guessing about how the economic conditions affected 
the daily lives of rank and file soldiers because they vocalized their discontent. By the mid 
1990s soldiers in at least Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Gambia, Guinea, Niger, Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone had all 
publicly claimed that they had not been paid their salaries or other monetary dues. Many 
soldiers also made complaints about decreased standards of living within the military.  A 
lack of salary payments and concerns over standards of living were paralleled in the civil 
service in many countries during this time period.xxiii   
Decreases in internal military spending is only one factor that contributed to 
declining military satisfaction in Africa in the late 1980s and into the 1990s; another 
important factor was changes to Cold War relationships.  Throughout the Cold War the 
international superpowers vied for African state loyalty and offered military assistance as a 
key incentive.  However by 1985 the Soviet Union began to disengage with Africa and the 
Western allies soon followed suit.xxiv The end of the Cold War also brought an end to much 
of the foreign military assistance and other perks that the military had become accustomed 
to, such as foreign military training and donations of equipment.xxv Although much of the 
expensive weapons provided by foreign powers during the Cold War were unnecessary for 
the type of conflicts most African countries endured, the downgrade likely symbolized a 
loss of prestige to many in the military.  
  With pressure to cut military spending and reduced assistance from abroad, 
equipment and maintenance in the late 1980s was neglected.xxvi  This neglect had 
significant consequences for West African troops in the 1990s when most members of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent troops to Liberia and 
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Sierra Leone. There were several mutinies following involvement in these multinational 
missions in which the deployed troops cited a lack of proper equipment and training 
among their list of grievances.xxvii 
One may question why soldiers began to mutiny only in the 1990s if their 
conditions were decreasing by the mid to late 1980s.  Scholars have raised similar 
questions about why the civilian democratization movement gained ground when it 
did.xxviii  Just as there is no singular reason to explain the civilian timing, there are also 
likely several reasons why soldiers were reluctant to mutiny in the 1980s.  It could be the 
case that conditions were not quite bad enough in the 1980s to trigger a mutiny.  Although 
defence spending had decreased in the late 1980s, widespread accusations of non-payment 
did not begin until the early 1990s.  Additionally, there was little indication that the largely 
authoritarian leaders who ruled in the 1970s and 1980s would make concessions to 
mutineers, which could have served as a disincentive. The reduced likelihood of mutinies 
under authoritarian regimes extends beyond this time period and will be further examined 
in the final section. 
It is also likely that the Cold War relationships that were strong in the 1970s and 
present, although weakening, in the 1980s served as a deterrent for mutinies. During the 
Cold War many African states relied on direct military support from their non-African 
allies. As Herbert Howe explains, the consistent willingness of foreign nations to intervene 
on the behalf of African leaders ‘undoubtedly dampened the aspirations of some potential 
insurgents or invaders.’xxix  It also likely caused potential mutineers to rethink plans to 
revolt.  Junior soldiers would have been aware that they would stand no chance against an 
attack by better-equipped and trained foreign soldiers. 
The end of the Cold War also reduced the willingness of non-African states to 
intervene in African conflicts.  France, who had once been quick to deploy its paratroopers 
to assist its former colonies, ended many of its mutual defence agreements with African 
countries.  For example, ‘the French government informed Félix Houphouët-Boigny, its 
key African ally, that he could not longer count on French military reinforcements to 
contain domestic unrest.’xxx  Interestingly, Houphouët-Boigny tested this threat during 
mutinies in the spring of 1990.  France stood by its word and refused the request for 
military assistance in putting down the mutinies.xxxi  Subsequently, the president gave in to 
many of the mutineers’ demands.  
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While the higher likelihood of foreign intervention throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
may have been a deterrence of mutinies, the lack of foreign intervention in the 1990s likely 
had the opposite effect.  Without the possibility of foreign assistance, leaders in the early 
1990s were quick to acquiesce to soldiers’ demands in order to avoid further instability, 
which was already growing with popular protests at the time.  
 
Mutual Mobilization 
 
In addition to economic trends and shifts in international relations, which led to 
more grievances among the military, the political mood of the time also likely played a 
part in the increased mutinies.  The swift regime changes that took place in the 1990s, 
following decades of authoritarian leadership can be attributed to both international and 
domestic factors. External donors began to introduce political conditionality to aid 
allocations, which required recipient countries to demonstrate respect for human rights and 
progress towards democracy. xxxii  Under the deteriorating economic conditions most states 
had little choice but to concede, at least to some degree.  While the political conditionality 
served as warnings for leaders who had grown accustom to neglecting democratic 
principles and human rights, in practice it was often selectively enforced.xxxiii  
By the late 1980s the credibility of single-party systems was challenged not only 
internationally but also internally. The decreasing per capita income levels for the average 
African caused people to further question the existing authoritarian and military-led 
political systems.  Shared economic hardships led to a ‘coalescence of political 
participation by all levels of society from elite to mass level.’xxxiv  One of the main ways in 
which this coalescence transpired was through mass protests.xxxv  
  The mass protests, which initially involved economic demands, widened to include 
political reforms. xxxvi Chris Allen et. al. note that while the popular calls for ‘good 
governance’ were often undefined, the movement can generally ‘be seen to include such 
elements as the rule of law, the safeguarding of basic human rights- including the right to 
organize, freedom of expression and freedom of the press- and the presence of honest and 
efficient government.’xxxvii  While mutineers in the 1990s did not directly demand 
government improvements in these same areas, examples in the following section will 
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show that issues such as rule of law, human rights, and freedom of expression were 
concerns also expressed in mutinies.  
Additionally, during the 1990s there were ‘soundly based popular perceptions that 
those closely associated with government did not personally share the effects of economic 
decline and, through massive corruption of public office, actually prospered whilst the 
majority suffered.’xxxviii Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes note a similar observation by 
stating, ‘Judging by the issues raised in the streets, people seemed to want accountability 
of leaders and to eliminate inequalities arising from official corruption.’xxxix  Similar to the 
complaints made by the civilian sector, mutineers also highlighted the large gap between 
wealth and lifestyle within a military context and attributed the large differences to 
corruption.xl As later examples will show, mutineers also made demands for accountability 
for their leadership.  Lastly, like the civilian sector, mutinying soldiers saw that one way to 
rectify the situation was to pressure change through a shared voice and both groups 
mobilized, although in a different fashion.   
Both the civilian democratization movement and the military mutinies also 
represent the desire for a reconfiguration of power dynamics.  This is consistent with 
Robert Dahl explanation of democratic theory which he states at a minimum involves ‘the 
processes by which ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over 
leaders.’xli  Although the civilian democratization movement was often unclear in its 
specific political goals, there was a general sense of empowerment which Bratton and 
Mates explain involved ‘citizens attaining a new measure of self-confidence and a wider 
scope of taking control of their own lives.’xlii  Mutinies can also be seen to represent a high 
degree of empowerment from the lower ranks and a desire for more control of their 
situations, neither of which are traits normally inherent in military hierarchies.  The 
similarities in the themes of the democratization movement and the military mutinies 
should not be seen as a coincidence, but instead it is more likely that junior soldiers gained 
inspiration and ideas from the movement.   
Several examples will help illustrate this overlap between themes in the democracy 
movement and mutinies in the 1990s.  First is the case of Côte d’Ivoire in which the 
economic crisis of the 1980s created particular problems for President Houphouët-
Boigny.xliii  ‘The government had long paid farmers a higher proportion of the world price 
of the country’s agricultural commodities, especially coffee and cocoa, than had most 
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African governments.’xliv  When world prices for coffee and cocoa dropped and the 
international donor community demanded austerity measures, President Houphouët-
Boigny decreased subsidies, imposed new taxes, and eliminated many government jobs.  
However, the economic crisis did not stop lavish state expenditures.xlv  In February of 1990 
the government announced a general cut of public wages by up to 40 percent and an 11 
percent rise in income taxes.xlvi  This caused a massive public reaction and students, utility 
workers, educational and professional associations, taxi-drivers, hospital staff, and factory 
workers orchestrated strikes and street protests throughout the following months calling for 
both economic and political reforms.xlvii   
In May of 1990 it was the military’s turn to express their discontent.  On May 14, 
around one hundred rank and file soldiers attempted to take over the state-run radio station 
and demanded to meet with the president.  The president promised the mutineers increased 
salaries, better living conditions, and reenlistment.xlviii  His willingness to quickly give in to 
the soldiers’ demands was likely due to an increased dependency on the military in the face 
of a growing civilian movement.  As previously mentioned, Houphouët-Boigny requested 
French military assistance but was denied the help.  Air force members took note of the 
army success and two days after the army mutiny they staged their own revolt using more 
severe tactics.   The fifty air force members armed with semi-automatic weapons seized the 
control tower and a terminal building of Abidjan International Airport.  Similar to the army 
recruits, they were angry over low pay and poor living conditions.  However, they also 
added grievances over corruption amongst the officer corps, claiming that their superiors 
docked their pay on a regular basis for little reason.xlix  When the government agreed to 
meet with the airmen to discuss their complaints the mutineers initially refused because 
one of the mediators was the Defence Minister.  The mutineers called him a ‘corrupt 
billionaire’ and demanded his removal from the negotiation process.l   
The mutineers in Côte d’Ivoire were likely inspired by the actions of local civilian 
protestors who had been expressing their discontent for months prior to the mutiny.  The 
civilian and military personnel shared both economic grievances and the idea that 
corruption or general government economic mismanagement was a cause of their hardship.   
The Gambia provides another good example of the overlap between political 
themes in the civilian realm and mutinies.  In the early 1990s The Gambia shared the 
burden of economic crisis seen throughout the continent, and dissatisfaction was expressed 
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through growing public protests.  President Jawara was considered an advocate of human 
and civil rights and often applauded for the country’s record of free and fair elections.li  
However, by the 1990s the Gambian press became increasingly critical of his nearly thirty 
years in office. Newspapers ran numerous stories accusing the government of inaction.  
For example, frequent news articles were published questioning why The Gambia still had 
no university. Public awareness and resentment over corruption in The Gambia was 
undoubtedly at an all time high by the early 1990s due to several ongoing corruption 
scandals.lii  
The frustrations with regards to inaction and corruption among political leadership 
seen in the civilian sector were also mirrored in the military.  Gambian soldiers returning 
from the ECOMOG mission to Liberia in 1991 and 1992 took to the streets when they did 
not receive their due pay. The soldiers accused their officers of being behind the late 
payment and specifically called for the removal of the highest-ranking officer in the 
country, Colonel Ndow Njie. These grievances supports Dr Abdoulaye Saine’s assessment 
that “the motivation to mutiny ran deeper than just pay…there was widespread disapproval 
with the regime, in part due to increased corruption.”liii  For the 60 junior soldiers in the 
1991 mutiny it was not enough to just receive their salary arrears, they also wanted 
someone to be held accountable for the delay.  The mutineers took their complaints 
directly to President Jawara at State House who met with the junior soldiers and conceded 
to their demands.  
The cases of the Ivoirian mutiny in 1990 and the Gambian mutiny in 1991 show a 
remarkable reconfiguration of power.  In both incidents the mutineers were rank and file 
soldiers and were able to engage directly with the Head of State.  In many states in 
previous decades it would have been inconceivable that junior ranks would take their 
issues directly to the president and even more shocking that the president would ‘obey’ 
these junior ranks.  However, leading into the 1990s there were increasing expectations 
that governments would be responsive.  Growing domestic opposition and changes to 
foreign relationships also put political leadership in a more vulnerable position and one in 
which they were more likely to grant concessions to the military.  The power shift can also 
be seen in the way that both groups of mutineers made accusations against the top 
individual in the military structure.  They show the belief that even an individual in a high 
position should not be above the standard regulations, signalling a major shift from 
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previous decades when ‘big men’ were clearly above the law. It is significant to note that 
the mutinies in Côte d’Ivoire in 1990 and The Gambia in 1991 were the first time either 
country had experienced a mutiny.  Therefore, it is unlikely that these soldiers had ‘learned’ 
to mutiny from other soldiers in their proximity but more likely that they picked up on 
common ideas expressed in the civilian sector, which in both cases had publicly protested 
just prior to the mutinies. 
 
 
Familiar Rhetoric 
 
It was not only the general concepts that overlapped between the democratization 
movement and mutinies; there were also similarities in the rhetoric used by mutineers and 
civilians.  Mutineers appeared aware of the popular demand for multi-party elections and 
were cautious to not appear to be threatening the democratic process.  They often seemed 
to want to distance themselves (at least in public statements) from military regimes and 
coup makers, who had lost popularity by the 1990s. For example, the spokesman for 
mutineers in Guinea Bissau in 1998 stated ‘We have already had the opportunity of stating 
on several occasions that we are soldiers, we do not want to become involved in 
politics…We do not claim the right to propose someone to be president of the Republic.’liv 
Similarly, soldiers in Central African Republic in 1996 said that their mutiny was 
‘corporatist’ and ‘apolitical’.  Their spokesman explained to Radio France International 
‘We have no intention of destabilizing the regime; President Patassé was democratically 
elected.lv   
  Aspects of the rhetoric used in the democratization movement such as justice and 
human rights also appeared within mutineer demands during the 1990s. For example, the 
spokesman for the 1996 Central African Republic mutiny stated, ‘We appeal to Amnesty 
International, and we agree to stop [the mutiny] this Friday evening.’lvi  In this case the 
soldiers attempted to gain sympathy from a prominent international organization by 
implying that their salary delay was a human rights violation.  While Amnesty 
International did not take on their cause, the soldiers’ call for their assistance showed an 
awareness of the growing international dialogue surrounding human rights and a creativity 
in how they could use the trend to their advantage.  
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  In 1997 mutineers in Central African Republic included in their demands ‘an end 
to any hampering of collective and individual liberties, in particular body searches, arrests 
and house searches.’  This is an especially unusual request from soldiers as ‘individual 
liberties’ are to some degree forfeited when soldiers join the military.  In particular, living 
spaces are often subject to inspection within a military context.  These demands, which are 
somewhat contradictory to military procedures, reflect the growing attention towards civil 
liberties at the time.  The comments also hint at the objection to arbitrary arrests and 
demonstrate ideas of the importance of following due legal processes.  
Mutineers in Guinea Bissau in 1998 also addressed issues of rule of law.  The 
spokesman for the mutiny commented about an ongoing arms trafficking scandal in which 
military members were accused of trafficking weapons to Casamance rebels by stating  
We want those who stand accused in the report to be brought to trial.  Even if 
Brigadier Ansumane Mane himself is accused, he must be brought to justice.  We 
are for justice because the law must take its course.  The law is above everything 
else, everyone, whoever they may be, must obey the law.lvii   
 
The soldiers in this case sound very similar to calls heard around the continent for justice 
and accountability for all levels of society, regardless of the paradox of having mutineers 
explain the need for obedience to the law. 
Despite their increased rhetoric about justice and calls for accountability, mutineers 
did not want those standards to apply to their own actions.  Mutineers in the 1990s 
appeared nervous about their post-mutiny prospects.  This makes sense considering the 
lack of mutinies in the 1970s and 1980s meant that soldiers had few precedents for how 
mutineers would be treated by the law.  To rectify this uncertainty about their status 
following the revolt, mutineers began to add to their demands stipulations that they would 
not be held accountable for their actions when the mutiny ended.  Soldiers in Central 
African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea all made deals with the government that gave 
them amnesty. Similarly, we should not assume that mutineers’ use of language regarding 
human rights and civil liberties actually translated into respect for human rights during this 
period.  Instead, it seems as if much of the democratic language demonstrated an 
awareness of what were considered respectable and legitimate reasons to protest.    
  In addition to borrowing rhetoric from the democratization movement, in some 
cases mutineers also imitated the civilians through their tactics.  For example, Gambian 
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soldiers in 1991 held a procession to State House while soldiers in Burkina Faso in 1997 
marched to the Defence Ministry to make their complaints heard, both in very similar 
fashions to civilian protestors at the time.  Mutineers in Burkina Faso in 1999 were 
reported to have chanted their demands, as is common during political protests.lviii  In this 
particular case soldiers would have had regular exposure to political protests because the 
mutiny occurred during a series of intense demonstrations against the Compaoré regime.  
Additionally, in the 1990s it was common for mutineers to assign a spokesperson for the 
group who would represent their cause to higher authorities and the media.  This pattern is 
similar to political, student, and trade organizations that also regularly used spokespersons 
to articulate the goals of the group. The demands made by mutineers in the 1990s, the 
language that they use, and the actions taken during the revolt appeared to be a product of 
the time period and the dominance of similar rhetoric and actions in the civilian sector. 
  
 
The Blurred Boundaries Between Junior Ranks and Civilians 
 
The above examples and the general argument that mutineers were inspired by 
popular political themes of the time raises the question of why the soldiers did not join 
forces with the civilian movement. While it is possible that individual soldiers had 
involvement with civil society organizations advancing democratic ideas, my research did 
not find evidence of widespread relationships between mutineers and civilian organisations 
across the region.  Given the earlier explanation of the military conditions in the 1980s and 
1990s it would be fair to assume soldiers would be sympathetic towards the 
democratization movement.  The military, especially its junior members, were suffering 
many of the same hardships as ordinary civilians and many of the calls for greater political 
liberties and respect for human rights would also benefit military members.  However, 
instead the military often put down mass protests, with only a few notable exceptions such 
as Mali in 1991.   
One explanation for why the military in most states did not become actively 
engaged in the democratization movement is that there had been a ‘virtual ‘privatization’ 
of key military units by incumbent dictators.’lix  These militaries or units were directly 
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loyal to the individual leaders.  Bratton and Van de Walle expand on why this would be the 
case by stating  
the armed forces often came to occupy a privileged position within the ancien 
régime.  To keep the soldiers content and under some semblance of civilian control, 
rulers granted to individual officers and the military units a generous array of perks, 
privileges, and rewards, including access to rents and commercial ventures.  
Transitions from authoritarian rule threaten these benefits, not only because the 
greater transparency of a democratic regime may lead to pressures for the 
suspension of privileges, but also because the military must negotiate with a new 
and usually less sympathetic political elite.lx   
 
For the elite members of the military a switch to new, democratic leadership could have 
meant an end to a good deal and for the rest of the military the uncertainty of the role of the 
military under civilian democratic leadership appeared to make them reluctant to jump on 
board with the movement.  
Hutchful argues that part of the blame for the reluctance of the military to join in 
must be placed on the democratization movement for failing to have a ‘clearly thought-out 
and articulated military policy.’lxi  He states ‘this strategy needed to separate the military 
institution clearly from the military regime and to avoid lumping the two together, as the 
democracy movement tended to do.’lxii  By ‘making wholesale attacks against the military’ 
those that may have been sympathetic to the movement were driven ‘into the arms of the 
regime.’lxiii  Although there were large elements of the military that were not satisfied 
under the authoritarian regimes of the 1970s and 1980s they also did not have trust or 
confidence that their lot would be improved with the movement towards democracy.  
Instead the junior soldiers seemed to instrumentalize many of the themes of the 
democratization movement for their own campaigns.   
Popular input in political decision-making and expectations for accountable 
leadership are widely internationally accepted concepts within a civilian realm.  However, 
these same concepts can be considered radical within a military context.  Military 
hierarchies intentionally prohibit junior members from having a say in the decision making 
process.  In the military, junior members are responsive to the orders of senior members; 
very rarely would the opposite pattern occur.  For junior soldiers to demand that their 
seniors respond to their requests is what Elihu Rose calls ‘an unnatural and unsettling state 
for troops.’lxiv  
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This raises questions as to why the popular civilian ideas, which are ‘unnatural’ in a 
military context would permeate the military sector.  Militaries usually implement policies 
to separate its members from wider civilian society.  For example, soldiers are typically 
housed on bases and required to wear uniforms and adhere to grooming standards which 
help unify the individuals but also separate them from civilians.  In many militaries 
worldwide, the duties of a soldier would often not require day-to-day interaction with 
civilians.  However in West and Central Africa militaries have often been utilized for 
domestic matters, which places soldiers in direct contact with civilians on a daily basis, 
through tasks such as manning road checkpoints.  African militaries were often closely 
linked to the head of state and his/her protection and therefore militaries often have a 
heavy presence in urban areas, particular capital cities.  Urban areas and capital cities were 
also the forefront of civilian political protests and many soldiers would have been exposed 
to their grievances and actions.  Lastly, it is very common for junior soldiers to live off 
base due to military housing shortages, which would mean these soldiers spend a lot of 
their time with civilians. 
It is not only the employment duties and lifestyles that likely exposed soldiers to 
themes of the democratization movement; the messages were spread through mediums in 
which soldiers would likely be exposed to.  For example, religious organizations played an 
important counterweight to authoritarian regimes with ‘political sermons’ popular 
throughout the 1990s.lxv  Increases in shortwave radios, private radio stations, and private 
newspapers allowed civilians and military alike greater access to political messages than in 
previous decades and led to an easier transfer of information across state borders.lxvi  
Sections of the youth, both student organizations and unemployed urban youth, also served 
as important instigators for political reform.lxvii   
 While militaries often have a contentious relationship with urban youth, we also 
must view junior soldiers as part of the same peer group who likely maintain personal links 
with students or urban youth.  Although military hierarchies often attempt to separate 
soldiers from the civilian population, the reality is that a large number of soldiers are 
youths, living in urban areas, listening to radios, and attending religious services in the 
same manner as much of the civilian population.  It is therefore understandable that 
soldiers picked many of the popular sentiments regarding democracy that were expressed 
in the civilian population up.    
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Freedom to Mutiny 
  
  Just as the pressure for democratic reform did not end in the 1990s, neither did 
mutinies. While the economic situation and political climate of the 1990s may have created 
the perfect condition for mutinies, a look beyond mutinies in the 1990s suggests a wider 
pattern of links between mutinies and democratic political systems. An examination of the 
incidents of mutiny (documented in Figure 1) in relation to the Freedom House ‘Freedom 
of the World’ index score of the country at the time of the revolt revealed that seventy-two 
percent of the mutinies occurred in states that were ranked as either ‘Free’ or ‘Partially 
Free.’ lxviii While there is room to critique the ability to categorize freedoms, specific 
country examples also indicate that mutinies generally occur more in countries exhibiting a 
higher degree of respect for political rights and civil liberties.   
  Just as there were few mutinies during the authoritarian regimes that dominated 
the continent in the 1970s and 1980s, there still remain few mutinies in the authoritarian 
regimes that exist in the region today.  For example, states in West and Central Africa 
consistently considered ‘Not Free’ such as Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon have not 
experienced mutinies.  The Gambia serves as a particularly interesting example of how 
authoritarian political systems may deter mutinies.  The Gambia has had a unique political 
trajectory with a reverse pattern of most states in the region.  During the 1980s when 
authoritarian regimes were common, The Gambia was one of the few considered to be 
democratic.  Yet, as many states in the region have increased civil liberties and democratic 
political practices, The Gambia has done the opposite.  It is currently one of the few 
countries in West Africa, which is labelled by Freedom House as ‘Not Free’ consistently 
over the last couple years.  While The Gambia had a series of mutinies in the 1990s, as the 
government has become increasingly repressive mutinies have ceased.  Nearly everyone I 
interviewed about the potential for a near future mutiny in The Gambia felt that it was very 
unlikely, as President Jammeh would see a mutiny as a direct threat and the soldiers would 
be severely disciplined.  They felt that a mutiny would not be worth the risk as there would 
be no chance of government negotiations with mutinous soldiers.lxix  Recent political 
executions in 2012 (the first officially in twenty-seven years), which included military 
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members accused of plotting against Jammeh, served as a brutal warning for the 
consequences of threatening state stability.lxx  
The most recent mutinies on the continent also support the trend of mutinies 
occurring more often in states with democratic political systems.  For example, mutinies 
took place in 2011 in Burkina Faso, which is ranked by Freedom House as ‘Partially Free,’ 
and in 2012 in Mali, which at the time was ranked as ‘Free.’  Sierra Leone has made 
considerable gains in political rights and civil liberties since the official end of its civil war 
and in 2013 was elevated to the category of ‘Free.’ The increased political freedoms have 
not necessarily erased soldiers’ grievances and some soldiers interviewed in 2011 and 
2012 warned that a future mutiny may be on the horizon.lxxi  The interviewees explained 
how their confidence in the political and justice system increased their confidence in 
conducting a mutiny.  For example, one soldier explained that he felt a mutiny would be 
successful under the current political leadership because ‘There are accessible leaders who 
want to know, who have an interest, who will listen.  They (senior officers) will be arrested 
and they will be jailed.’lxxii  This individual believes the government will be responsive to 
their concerns, a significant shift from attitudes about the government in the 1990s.  While 
the Gambian interviewees felt a mutiny was unlikely due to the unwillingness of the 
government to respond, the Sierra Leoneans saw mutiny as a way to communicate with 
higher authorities, which they felt would be open to discussing their grievances.  
The pattern of mutinies occurring most often in states that have at least some 
respect for democratic principles is somewhat counterintuitive.  It may seem logical that 
soldiers would revolt under a repressive system, however it is that system which would 
prohibit a successful mutiny.  Mutinies require leadership that is willing to listen and 
respond, which is more likely under a democratic regime than an authoritarian one. 
Although it may be hard to convince leaders that they should be flattered by mutinying 
soldiers, mutinies do in some ways represent a level of faith in leadership to adequately 
address grievances.  When soldiers have no faith that a leader will respond or the political 
system is so fragmented that there is no one to hear the complaints (such as during the civil 
wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia) mutinies become a pointless endeavour.  As earlier noted, 
soldiers may also see an opportunity to gain leverage through a mutiny in situations in 
which political leadership has been under threat by civilian unrest. 
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  However it is not only the perceptions that democratic leaders are more responsive 
that may make soldiers in democratic countries more prone to mutinies; the civil liberties 
often associated with democratic political systems work to the advantage of mutineers.  
Increased freedoms of media in particular provide soldiers, as well as civilians, with new 
tools to express their grievances.  The media in Africa in the 1970s and into the 1980s was 
often state-controlled with ‘people being spoken to, not listened to.’lxxiii  However, this 
began to change in the 1990s as one country after another introduced legislation that gave 
local press the freedoms it lacked in previous decades. The increased media freedoms were 
partially a result of the democratization movement but were also used to further pressure 
political reform.  The new freedoms of media allowed reporters (however not without risk) 
to ‘reveal what [was] going on behind the well draped windows of public institutions.’lxxiv  
There was increased public scrutiny of political figures and government procedures, with 
growing attention towards corruption. While not all states have progressed in an equal 
fashion towards increased media freedoms, generally speaking there have been more 
privatized media and more access to international media from the 1990s onward than in 
previous decades.  The increased privatization of media sources as well as introduction of 
new forms of media has resulted in more interactive media, allowing messages to move 
‘downwards, upwards, and sideways.’lxxv  
 From the 1990s onward the media became a more popular tool for mutineers, with 
increased use of radio announcements and media interviews.  These tactics serve as a way 
for mutineers to work around the chain of command and in some cases to connect with the 
international community and the civilian population.  In recent years there is a growing 
trend of soldiers utilizing the media to publicly express their grievances in hopes that a 
threat of revolt will be enough to resolve their complaints.  For example, Nigerian soldiers 
contacted the media to threaten their leaders with a mutiny in 2012 while Sierra Leonean 
soldiers and Malians soldiers suggested similar to the media in their respective countries in 
2013.lxxvi   
 
Conclusion  
 
An examination of mutinies across time has shown that they most often occur in 
states with some respect for political freedoms and civil liberties, a pattern that was 
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particularly apparent with the increase of revolts in the 1990s. Soldiers likely view 
democratic leaders as more responsive and they often utilize the political freedoms and 
civil liberties that are associated with democracies to their advantage during mutinies.   
This article has shown that mutinies in the 1990s can be seen as a way to gauge the 
impact international economic and political changes had on rank and file soldiers and also 
demonstrates a way they responded to the effects.  It has proposed that soldiers in the 
1990s were not immune to the political currents of the time, even if they were regularly 
seen as suppressing the movement.  Issues that were prominent in the civilian sector, such 
as awareness of corruption and demands for accountability, were also key themes in 
mutinies.  Just as ‘ordinary citizens’ in the 1990s began to ‘exert a high degree of control 
over leaders,’ lxxvii so did rank and file soldiers through increased mutinies. Mutineers in 
the 1990s also used similar rhetoric and tactics as those in the civilian sector who were 
pushing for democratic reform.   
The attitude of the military towards the democratization movement is not one of 
complete support or disregard, but rather a more nuanced relationship.  Hutchful may be 
correct in his assessment that the democracy movement ‘lost the battle for the 
military;’lxxviii however I have suggested that the movement was not lost on the rank and 
file soldiers. Mutineers adopted and adapted aspects of popular political themes of the time 
to articulate their grievances and improve their conditions. The use of political rhetoric 
within African militaries has been a trend since early independence years.  However, most 
analysis has focused on the political ideology of the officers who came to power in coups.  
This article has shed light on ways the rank and file interpret popular political messages.  
Although soldiers are often distinguished from civilians through uniforms, regulations, and 
lifestyle restrictions, this analysis has demonstrated that the division is not absolute. 
Through the lens of mutiny we can see the ways that junior soldiers are both a part of 
larger society and influenced by political culture within the public sphere. 
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